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Abstract
There is growing international concern about the risks posed by direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of 
prescription pharmaceuticals, including via the internet. Recent trade agreements negotiated by the United 
States, however, incorporate provisions that may constrain national regulation of DTCA.  Some provisions 
explicitly mention DTCA; others enable foreign investors to seek compensation if new regulations are seen to 
harm their investments. These provisions may thus prevent countries from restricting DTCA or put them at risk 
of expensive legal action from companies seeking damages due to restrictions on advertising. While the most 
recent example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), collapsed following US withdrawal in January 
2017, early indications of the Trump Administration’s trade policy agenda signal an even more aggressive 
approach on the part of the United States in negotiating advantages for American businesses. Furthermore, the 
eleven remaining TPP countries may decide to proceed with the agreement in the absence of the United States, 
with most of the original text (including the provisions relevant to DTCA) intact. 
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Background
International trade agreements negotiated over the last 
two decades include many provisions affecting domestic 
health policy,1 but their implications for direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA) remain relatively unexplored. This paper 
examines their implications for the ability of nation states to 
prohibit or circumscribe DTCA. 
Why Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Is Contentious?
DTCA of prescription pharmaceuticals is banned in most 
countries due to perceived deleterious effects on rational 
prescribing, pharmaceutical expenditure, and health 
outcomes. DTCA increases expenditure by stimulating 
demand for particular, usually patented, products and 
shifting demand away from cheaper alternatives.2 DTCA is 
also associated with distorted drug information, unnecessary 
prescriptions, and reduced prescribing quality.2,3 Drugs 
promoted via DTCA are often early in their product lifecycle 
and sometimes subsequently manifest serious harms leading 
to market withdrawal.4 Various benefits have been claimed for 
DTCA, including patient empowerment, informed decision-
making and reduced disease-related stigma.2,5 In support 
of this, there is some evidence that DTCA increases doctor 
visits by newly diagnosed patients and increases treatment of 
preventable conditions.6 The evidence base is not sufficiently 
developed, however, to establish whether these benefits 
outweigh the apparent harms of DTCA.2,7 Concerns that the 
motivation for DTCA is more about marketing than providing 
information to the public are reinforced by evidence that 
pharmaceutical companies spend nearly twice as much on 
marketing as on research and development.8
More recently, concerns have been expressed about how 
pharmaceutical companies are circumventing restrictions 
on DTCA by promoting ‘disease awareness’ while avoiding 
specific mention of their products.9 Similarly, direct to 
consumer marketing of medical testing has developed into 
a highly profitable variation on the theme of exploiting 
the public’s health anxieties and often unsophisticated 
understanding of risk.10 These developments indicate the 
industry’s creativity in identifying and exploiting weaknesses 
in DTCA regulation and suggest that continued vigilance is 
needed.
Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Digital or internet-based DTCA - the type explicitly targeted 
in recently negotiated US trade agreements - raises particular 
challenges for regulators. This form of advertising is 
increasingly important to the pharmaceutical industry given 
the public’s extensive and growing use of the internet for health 
information.11 A study of violations and warnings sent by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to pharmaceutical 
companies from 2005-2014 found the overwhelming majority 
(approximately 95%) of alleged breaches related to online 
advertising.5 Violations typically involved inadequate or 
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misleading information regarding indications, efficacy and 
harms of advertised products.5
In the two industrialized countries which currently allow 
DTCA – the United States and New Zealand – momentum is 
building for policy change.12,13 Opposition comes from both 
professional and consumer groups, and is apparent also in 
countries resisting the proposed introduction of DTCA.14 
Policy flexibility sacrificed during trade negotiations, 
however, may compromise efforts to restrict DTCA.
Trade Agreements and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
The first trade agreement to specifically mention DTCA 
was the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), 
which came into force in 2005. The United States, which 
hosts the headquarters for many of the world’s transnational 
pharmaceutical companies, sought to legalise DTCA via the 
internet through the clause15: 
“Each Party shall permit a pharmaceutical manufacturer to 
disseminate to health professionals and consumers through 
the manufacturer’s Internet site registered in the territory 
of the Party, and on other Internet sites registered in the 
territory of the Party linked to that site, truthful and not 
misleading information regarding its pharmaceuticals that 
are approved for sale in the Party’s territory as is permitted 
to be disseminated under the Party’s laws, regulations, 
and procedures, provided that the information includes a 
balance of risks and benefits and encompasses all indications 
for which the Party’s competent regulatory authorities have 
approved the marketing of the pharmaceuticals.”
Despite the intent of this text to legalise DTCA, Australia 
was able to maintain its prohibition due to the phrase “as 
is permitted to be disseminated under the Party’s laws, 
regulations, and procedures,” which effectively neutralised 
the provision.16 
The inclusion of the DTCA provision in the AUSFTA, however, 
had a further consequence. Trade agreements negotiated by 
the US tend to follow a ‘template approach,’ with the text of 
each agreement building on the last. When the United States 
negotiated its next trade agreement with South Korea, the US-
Korea Free Trade Agreement (known as KORUS), the DTCA 
provision was included, but the crucial reference to existing 
domestic laws, regulations and procedures (“as is permitted 
to be disseminated under the Party’s laws, regulations and 
procedures”) was omitted.16 
The net effect of KORUS on South Korea’s prohibition of 
pharmaceutical advertising is uncertain. In 2008, not long 
after the signing of KORUS the previous year, regulations were 
relaxed to allow advertising of prescription drug treatments 
for certain infectious diseases,17 but it is unclear to what extent 
these changes are related to the implementation of KORUS. 
AUSFTA and KORUS set a new norm for the inclusion of 
DTCA clauses in US-led trade agreements – one which was 
carried through into the negotiations for the twelve-country 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).16 Negotiation 
of the TPP raised concerns about the health effects that 
could arise from, for example, expanded intellectual 
property protections for pharmaceuticals, rules applying 
to pharmaceutical coverage programs, and the inclusion of 
an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism allowing 
foreign investors to seek compensation over policies or laws 
that harm their investments.18,19 While the TPP apparently 
collapsed following the US withdrawal in January 2017, it 
remains important to analyse its implications for DTCA, 
given the US tendency to use previously negotiated text as 
the starting point for future trade agreements. The remaining 
11 parties are also considering revitalising the agreement 
without the United States,20 and it is unclear to what degree 
the original text will be retained. The prime ministers of Japan 
and New Zealand, two countries which had already ratified 
the TPP prior to US withdrawal, appear intent on retaining 
the original text and avoiding re-negotiation.21
The DTCA clause in the TPP is similar to AUSFTA, at first 
glance appearing to legalise digital DTCA, but also making the 
clause subject to participating countries’ laws, regulations and 
procedures.22 The clause was not subject to the TPP’s state-
to-state dispute settlement mechanisms, meaning that one 
country could not have enforced another’s implementation of 
the provision.
On the other hand, the TPP would have conferred an 
additional risk, in comparison with AUSFTA, for countries 
seeking to maintain or introduce restrictions on DTCA. An 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in TPP’s 
investment chapter enables a company incorporated in one 
nation to bring legal action against another’s government 
in an international tribunal, by arguing that a policy or law 
change harmed its investments.
In trade agreements with ISDS, the inclusion of DTCA 
provisions could be perceived as affecting investor rights. 
Government attempts to prohibit DTCA, or to regulate 
advertising aimed at prescribers, could thus be contested using 
ISDS. The attractiveness of ISDS to industry is illustrated by 
US pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly’s (ultimately unsuccessful) 
case brought against Canada, seeking $500 million CAD in 
compensation after patents on two drugs were revoked by 
Canadian courts.23
Countries that prohibit DTCA have sought to neutralize the 
impact of pro-DTCA provisions through the clever use of 
language (as in the case of AUSFTA and the TPP), but the 
combination of these provisions with ISDS presents new 
risks. ISDS can be prohibitively expensive: the average cost 
of defending a case has been estimated at 8 million USD,24 
and the awards can be in the hundreds of millions.25 In this 
context, even the threat of litigation can deter countries from 
adopting policies that impact on foreign investors.
It seems likely that having secured a DTCA clause in AUSFTA 
and KORUS, and having negotiated one for the TPP, the 
United States will continue to pursue this strategy in future 
negotiations. Early indications of the Trump Administration’s 
trade policy agenda26 herald an even more aggressive use 
of leverage on the part of the United States to secure access 
to foreign markets for US corporations. Furthermore, the 
provisions relevant to DTCA may well be adopted in their 
current form if the eleven remaining countries proceed with 
the TPP, particularly if as much as possible of the TPP text is 
retained in order to progress the agreement “expeditiously”20 
and perhaps also in the hope that the United States will re-join 
the agreement in future.
Conclusion
Provisions in recent trade agreements negotiated by the US 
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threaten domestic regulation of pharmaceutical advertising. 
Countries wanting to impose or retain advertising restrictions 
should be cautious about accepting provisions that legalise 
DTCA, or that could lend weight to industry disputes over 
DTCA regulation – particularly in the presence of ISDS.
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